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a b s t r a c t
Most commentators expect improved energy efﬁciency and reduced energy demand to provide the
dominant contribution to tackling global climate change. But at the global level, the correlation between
increased wealth and increased energy consumption is very strong and the impact of policies to reduce
energy demand is both limited and contested. Different academic disciplines approach energy demand
reduction in different ways: emphasising some mechanisms and neglecting others, being more or less
optimistic about the potential for reducing energy demand and providing insights that are more or less
useful for policymakers. This article provides an overview of the main issues and challenges associated
with energy demand reduction, summarises how this challenge is ‘framed’ by key academic disciplines,
indicates how these can provide complementary insights for policymakers and argues that a ‘socio-
technical’ perspective can provide a deeper understanding of the nature of this challenge and the
processes through which it can be achieved. The article integrates ideas from the natural sciences,
economics, psychology, innovation studies and sociology but does not give equal weight to each. It
argues that reducing energy demand will prove more difﬁcult than is commonly assumed and current
approaches will be insufﬁcient to deliver the transformation required.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Improving energy efﬁciency and reducing energy demand are
widely considered as the most promising, fastest, cheapest and safest
means to mitigate climate change. Many opportunities appear to be
cost-effective at current energy prices and can deliver additional
beneﬁts such as improved energy security, reduced fuel poverty and
increased economic productivity. Reﬂecting this, the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and other bodies are placing increasing priority
on reducing energy demand, the European Commission has pro-
posed long-term targets for energy demand reduction and countries
throughout the world are introducing a range of policies to deliver
those reductions.
But previous attempts at reducing energy demand have not always
been successful. Frequently, the assumptions on which policy inter-
ventions are based do not adequately reﬂect either the challenges
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involved or the factors shaping individual and organisational decision-
making. Moreover, the complexity of economic systems can lead to
unintended and unanticipated consequences from those interventions
that may undermine the original aims. Policies are usually informed
to varying degrees by ideas from academic research, but different
academic disciplines approach the challenge of reducing energy
demand in different ways—emphasising some mechanisms and
neglecting others, preferring some methodological approaches and
sources of evidence over others, and providing competing recommen-
dations. In turn, different disciplines are more or less optimistic about
the potential for reducing energy demand and provide insights that
are more or less useful for policymakers.
The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the issues
associated with energy demand reduction, to summarise the ‘fram-
ings’ of this challenge by the academic communities that are most
inﬂuential in this area and to argue that a ‘sociotechnical’ perspective
can offer additional insights. The article integrates ideas from the
natural sciences, economics, psychology, innovation studies and socio-
logy but does not give equal weight to each—for example, it does not
discuss the application of social practice theory to energy demand [1].
The aim is not to provide a comprehensive review of the literature, but
instead to highlight key issues and challenges, to indicate how diff-
erent approaches can provide complementary insights and to suggest
a way forward. In doing so, it is hoped that the article will help
improve understanding between different disciplinary perspectives.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 begins by exploring
the close link between energy demand and the scale of physical and
human systems, while Section 3 examines the complex and contested
relationship between energy consumption and economic growth.
Section 4 summarises the multiple interpretations of improved energy
efﬁciency and shows why the relationship between this and reduced
energy demand is far from straightforward. Sections 5 and 6 summar-
ise the key insights into the determinants of energy demand provided
by orthodox and behavioural economics, social psychology and
innovation studies and argues that each of these can inform the
design of energy efﬁciency policy. However, current approaches seem
unlikely to deliver the scale and speed of reductions in energy demand
that are likely to be required to mitigate climate change. Section 7
argues that these more radical demand reductions imply fundamental
changes in the ‘sociotechnical systems’ that provide energy services,
and brieﬂy discusses how such changes may come about. Section 8
concludes.
2. System scale and energy demand
2.1. An understanding of energy demand must begin with the
natural sciences
Energy is a mysterious property of objects and systems that can
be neither created nor destroyed, but can be transferred from one
system to another and converted from one form to another. Since not
all forms of energy are equally useful, a more relevant quantity is
exergy or the availability to perform physical work. Exergy is a
measure of both the quantity and quality of energy and, unlike
energy, can be destroyed during conversion processes (e.g. in the
conversion of electricity to low temperature heat). Energy – or more
precisely, exergy – is of unique importance in nature because nothing
functions without it. Complex physical systems such as organisms,
ecosystems and human societies exist far from thermodynamic
equilibrium and can only be maintained in this state by a constant
throughput of high quality energy from outside the system—with
larger and more complex systems requiring larger energy ﬂows.
Biologists and ecologists have identiﬁed remarkably consistent
and apparently universal relationships between the physical scale
of systems and the size of these of energy ﬂows, based upon
quarter power exponents [2,3]. For example, the metabolic rate of
organisms scales with the three-quarter power of mass over 27 of
orders of magnitude, from the smallest microbes to the largest
mammals [2,4]. There appear to be common principles underlying
this universal relationship, linked to the evolutionary optimisation
of the fractal-like branching networks that supply energy and
materials to organic systems—such as the vascular system of pla-
nts and the circulatory system of mammals [4].
Since human societies rely upon analogous networks for distribut-
ing energy, water, food and other materials they may be subject to
comparable constraints and hence exhibit comparable relationships
between system scale and energy ﬂows [5]. While drawing analogies
between physical and human systems can be problematic, it is
demonstrably the case that larger, wealthier, more populous and more
complex societies require larger energy ﬂows. Such societies evolved
by accessing progressively larger energy ﬂows and they cannot be
sustained in the absence of those ﬂows [6]. The massive increases in
global population and wealth since the beginning of the 19th century
have been associated with equally massive increases in energy
consumption, derived largely from the ‘energy surplus’ provided by
fossil fuels (i.e. the energy available from those fuels after subtracting
the energy used to obtain them). Speciﬁcally, the sevenfold increase in
global population since 1800 has been paralleled by a four-fold
increase in per capita primary energy consumption (eight-fold in the
industrialised world), leading to a 27-fold increase in global energy
consumption [7].
The rate of growth of global primary energy consumption has been
remarkably stable since 1850 (2.4%/year 70.08%) and shows no sign
of slowing down [8]. Hence, if energy demand reduction is to be
measured as a departure from this 150-year trend, there appears to be
little sign of it yet at the global level. However, since primary energy
consumption (E) has grown more slowly than gross domestic product
(GDP) (Y), there has been a steady decline in global energy intensity
(E/Y) and hence a steady increase in energy productivity (Y/E), with the
precise trend depending upon how these variables are measured.
Aggregate energy consumption is commonly expressed as the product
of population (P), per capita wealth (Y/P) and energy intensity (E/Y),
but many factors contribute to these aggregate ratios and more
disaggregated breakdowns are required to understand their trends.
The IEA [9] estimate that global energy intensity declined by 1.3%/year
between 1990 and 2000, but this slowed to 0.4%/year after 2000 as a
consequence of emerging economies (notably China) accounting for a
larger proportion of global GDP. These economies are more energy
intensive than the global average, but they are also reducing their
energy intensity (and growing their economies) at a more rapid rate.
Regional trends in economic growth and energy consumption
underpin this global picture and are consistent with it. For example,
Brown et al. [10] examined 220 countries over 24 years and found
that, on average, every 1% increase in per capita wealth was associated
with a 0.76% increase in per capita energy consumption. As the
authors observe, the closeness of this result to the three-quarter
power relationship observed in natural systems may not be a coin-
cidence. Similarly, Csereklyei et al. [11] analysed 99 countries over the
period 1971–2010 and found a comparable elasticity of approximately
0.7—implying that energy intensity is lower in richer countries and
that, on average, a 1% increase in per capita income is associated with
a 0.3% decrease in per capita energy intensity. This result was derived
from repeated cross-sectional analyses of national data and indicates
that the per capita energy use associated with any given level of per
capita income has not changed for four decades. The long-term
decline in regional and global energy intensity is therefore due to
countries getting richer rather than from producing particular levels of
wealth with less energy. This in turn suggests that the technological
changes that have reduced energy intensity are strongly correlated
with the technological changes that have increased per capita wealth.
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The stability of the aggregate relationship between per capita
wealth and per capita energy consumption obscures the signiﬁcant
and important variations from one country to another. Countries
with similar per capita GDP can differ by an order of magnitude in
their per capita energy consumption (and vice versa) as a conse-
quence of differences in energy resources, energy prices, fuel mix,
climate, population density, economic structure, regulatory standards
and other variables. Notable outliers include energy-producing coun-
tries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Australia and the US, where fossil
fuels are subsidised or only lightly taxed. The US, for example,
requires 50% more energy than the EU to produce a unit of GDP.
Similarly, while per capita energy use increases with per capita
income, the relative rates of growth of these two variables vary from
one country to another and over time as a consequence of varying
rates, types and directions of change in economic structure, fuel mix,
technological efﬁciency and other variables.
It is critically important to understand the reasons for these spatial
and temporal variations and to identify whether, how and to what
extent patterns in one region and time period can be reproduced in
different regions and time periods. Of particular interest are countries
such as the UK and Denmark which have succeeded in growing their
economies over periods of a decade or more with primary energy
consumption declining in per capita and sometimes in absolute terms.
But to date, these countries are too few in number and too small in
size to have any noticeable inﬂuence on the global trends. Also, since
this success has partly been achieved by scaling down domestic
manufacturing, it may have been offset by increased energy use
elsewhere. For example, while the UK’s territorial GHG emissions fell
by 27% between 1990 and 2008, it’s ‘consumption-based’ emissions
increased by 20% as a consequence of imported consumer goods
displacing (more energy efﬁcient) domestically produced goods [12].
Such displacement is clearly not possible at the global level.
With populations growing and per capita energy consumption
rising, global energy consumption continues its upward trend—grow-
ing by 2.3% in 2012–2013. Population growth has slowed in the
industrialised world, but the increased wealth driving this ‘demo-
graphic transition’ is closely linked to higher per capita energy
consumption. Analysis by DeLong et al. [13] suggests that national
populations may stabilise when the rate of energy consumption
reaches approximately 13 kW per capita which is at least ﬁve times
the current global average. If correct, this suggests a huge potential for
increased energy demand unless the dominant and long-established
relationships between energy, wealth and population can be modiﬁed
in a signiﬁcant way. Hence, an understanding of these complex
relationships must form the basis of any meaningful discussion of
energy demand reduction.
3. Economic growth and energy demand
The previous section has shown that aggregate energy demand is
closely correlated with the population and wealth of human socie-
ties, but there is considerable variation from one country to another.
A key question is whether energy consumption increases because
wealthier people demand more goods and services, or whether the
availability of this energy drives the increase in wealth. In practice,
both mechanisms coexist and are interdependent, with changes in
energy availability, technology, income and population reinforcing
each within positive feedback loops [14]. Establishing the relative
importance of different variables is correspondingly difﬁcult, with
sophisticated econometric studies providing contradictory results
[15,16]. The mainstream view is strongly inﬂuenced by orthodox
economics which argues that the small share of energy in total input
costs implies that increased energy consumption can only provide a
small contribution to the growth in economic output. Robert Solow
was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for developing
a model of economic growth that ignored energy altogether [17] and
it wasn’t until the 1970s that orthodox ‘production functions’ rout-
inely included energy as one of their inputs. In contrast many
economic historians [18], natural scientists [19] and ecological econo-
mists [20,21] consider energy to be critical for economic growth—
with the massive energy surplus from fossil fuels liberating humanity
from prior biophysical constraints:
… As long as supplies of both mechanical and heat energy were
conditioned by the annual quantum of insolation and the
efﬁciency of plant photosynthesis in capturing incoming solar
radiation, it was idle to expect a radical improvement in
material conditions of the bulk of mankind… [18]
…economic growth in the past has been driven primarily not
by ‘technological progress’ in some general sense but speciﬁ-
cally by the availability of cheaper energy…from coal, petro-
leum and gas…. As Alvin Weinberg once said, energy is the
ultimate resource. It is essential. It is needed for every eco-
nomic sector and activity and there is no substitute… [22].
Ecological economists claim that the improvements in labour prod-
uctivity over the last century have largely been achieved by providing
workers with increasing quantities of energy, both directly and
indirectly as embodied in capital equipment and technology [21,23].
There has also been a progressive shift towards higher quality energy
carriers (e.g. more energy dense, more ﬂexible, more transportable)
which has allowed more economic output to be produced from each
unit of energy input. Capital equipment embodies technological inno-
vations, but since the primary use of that equipment is to transform
energy ﬂows into energy services, and since the equipment would be
useless without those energy ﬂows, technical change and increased
energy use are closely linked. Ecological economists therefore view
energy as contributing more to economic growth than is suggested by
its small share of total input costs. More primary energy inputs leads
to more useful energy and more ﬁnal energy services, but this may
also be achieved by shifting towards higher quality energy inputs and
by improving thermodynamic conversion efﬁciency [24].
The feasibility of signiﬁcant energy demand reduction may
depend in part onwhich of these views is correct—with the orthodox
perspective suggesting more scope for reducing energy demand than
the ecological perspective. But the relationship between increased
energy inputs, technical change and economic growth is complex
and the empirical evidence is open to competing interpretations [15].
In developed economies, there is some evidence to suggest that the
historical link between energy ﬂows and economic output has
weakened since the 1970s, perhaps as a consequence of the diffusion
of information and communication technologies (ICT) [25]. Kander
et al. [25] claim that ICT enables a less energy intensive form of
economic development and that reductions in European energy
intensity since 1970 owe more to the diffusion of ICT than to the
shift towards a service-based economy. Similarly, Stern and Kander’s
analysis of Swedish economic growth over the past century indicates
that the contribution of energy to economic growth has declined
over time [26]. These studies, together with the inter-country
variation in energy intensity noted above, provide some support
for the claim that a greater decoupling of national and global energy
demand from GDP may be expected in the future. But on present
evidence, expectations of rising incomes alongside falling energy
consumption appear optimistic. Such an outcome would amount to
an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) for energy [27], but to date
the evidence for such curves is conﬁned to a limited number of
short-term and local environmental problems and appears largely
absent for energy consumption [15].
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4. Energy efﬁciency and energy demand
Despite the strength of these historical correlations, improved
energy efﬁciency and reduced energy demand are widely expected to
provide the dominant contribution to reduced carbon emissions in
the short to medium term—and to do so at little or possibly negative
cost. For example, the IEA’s ‘450 scenario’ has improved energy
efﬁciency accounting for 71% of emission reductions (relative to the
baseline scenario) in the period to 2020 and 48% in the period to
2035 [9]. But the link between improved energy efﬁciency and
reduced energy demand (and hence emissions) is not straightfor-
ward: the ﬁrst need not necessarily lead to the second, and both can
be interpreted and measured in multiple ways.
Energy efﬁciency is the ratio of useful outputs to energy inputs for
a speciﬁed system – such as a motor, a machine tool, an industrial
process, a ﬁrm, a sector or an entire economy –while energy intensity
is the inverse of this measure. In all cases, the measure of energy
efﬁciency will depend upon how inputs and outputs are deﬁned and
measured. Depending upon the system, outputs may be measured in
energy terms, such as heat content or physical work; physical terms,
such as vehicle kilometres or tonnes of steel; or economic terms such
as value-added or GDP [28]. Different measures may be more or less
appropriate for different systems and purposes, and no measure will
capture everything of value. For example, vehicle kilometres and
passenger kilometres both measure the quantity of mobility, but the
former does not capture load factors, the latter does not capture
passenger comfort and neither are necessarily correlated with the
frequency and ease of access to relevant destinations.
In many cases the most relevant output of a system is an energy
service of some form, such as motive power, thermal comfort and
accessibility. But energy services are difﬁcult to measure, dependent
upon social context and partly subjective, so a different deﬁnition,
interpretation or understanding of the relevant energy service may
lead to a different judgement on the energy efﬁciency of a particular
system. For example, thermal comfort depends upon internal air
temperature, but also upon radiant temperature, air velocity, humid-
ity, activity levels, clothing, external temperature, behavioural norms
and sociocultural conditions, so the thermodynamic efﬁciency of the
boiler and the thermal performance of the building envelope are far
from the only considerations.
The measurement of energy inputs also raises issues, especially
when different energy carriers are combined [29]. The most common
approach is to sum the thermal content of each energy carrier (in
joules), but this amounts to summing apples and oranges. Energy
carriers vary on multiple dimensions (e.g. volumetric energy density,
gravimetric energy density, ease of storage, ease of transport, cleanli-
ness) and they are only partially substitutable (e.g. try running a truck
on battery-stored electricity). Higher quality energy carriers receive a
higher price since they are more ﬂexible, suitable for a wider range of
end uses and produce more economic output per joule [29]. Price-
based weighting schemes should therefore be (but rarely are) used to
account for the different quality of energy carriers and when this is
done aggregate measures of energy efﬁciency are found to be
improving more slowly than is commonly supposed [29–31]. For
example, Kaufmann [32] shows that much of the reduction in US
energy intensity between 1950 and 1990 was linked to the shift
towards higher quality and hence more productive energy inputs –
such as from coal to oil – rather than from efﬁciency improvements
per se.
Importantly, improvements in one measure of energy efﬁciency
may not be reﬂected in improvements in a second measure, or in
measures appropriate for a different spatial or temporal boundary.
Indeed, it is entirely possible for an improvement in onemeasure to be
associated with deterioration in another. For example, an electric heat
pump is more energy efﬁcient than a gas boiler when energy inputs
are measured at the building level, but may be less energy-efﬁcient
when those inputs are measured at the source level (e.g. the fuel into
the power station) or on a life cycle basis. Similarly, Kaufmann [33]
shows how the energy savings in the US forest products industry over
the period 1958–1984 were largely offset by the energy used to
produce the relevant capital equipment.
In a similar manner, improvements in energy efﬁciency (however
measured) may not always reduce energy demand and reductions in
energy demand may result from something other than improved
energy efﬁciency. To claim ‘energy-savings’ or ‘demand reduction’ it is
necessary to specify the reference against which those savings are
measured or estimated. That involves specifying the relevant spatial
and temporal boundary and unit of measure, as well as invoking
ceteris paribus assumptions. The reference may be historical energy
consumption or a counterfactual scenario of what energy consump-
tion ‘would have been’ in the absence of speciﬁed changes. But since
data on energy consumption is not always available (or accurate),
counterfactuals are unobservable and countervailing variables are
difﬁcult to control (for), the causal link between speciﬁc changes
and the resulting ‘energy savings’ can be hard to establish. Most
approaches rely upon decomposition or econometric analysis of
secondary data at the aggregate level and the results are frequently
lacking in resolution and sensitive to model speciﬁcation. Experimen-
tal or quasi experimental studies can control for confounding variables
at the micro level, but these are costly to conduct, comparatively rare
and restricted in their spatial and temporal boundaries. As a result, the
literature is replete with unreliable estimates of historical energy
savings and questionable claims about future energy savings—both in
relation to speciﬁc technologies and policies and in relation to the
determinants of aggregate trends. California, for example, is hailed as
an energy efﬁciency success story since per capita electricity con-
sumption has remained fairly constant since the 1970s and is more
than 40% below the US average. But a careful analysis of the contr-
ibutory factors ﬁnds that California’s ambitious energy efﬁciency
policies account for less than one third of this difference [34].
The link between improved energy efﬁciency and reduced energy
demand is further complicated by the presence of multiple rebound
effects. For example, since fuel-efﬁcient cars make travel cheaper,
consumers may choose to drive further and/or more often, thereby
offsetting some of the energy savings achieved. Drivers may use the
savings on fuel bills to buy other goods and services which necessarily
require energy to provide—such as laptops made in China and shipped
to the UK. Reductions in fuel demand will translate into lower fuel
prices which in turn will encourage increased fuel consumption else-
where. Similar mechanisms exist in industry, where cost-effective
energy efﬁciency improvements allow ﬁrms to expand output, lower
product prices and increase market demand which in turn stimulates
economic growth and aggregate energy consumption. In some cases,
energy efﬁcient innovations may lead to new, unforeseen energy-
using applications, products and industries [35,36]. For example, the
Bessemer process greatly improved the energy efﬁciency of steel-
making, but also produced cheaper and higher quality steel suitable
for a wider range of uses, thereby increasing demand for both steel
and coal. Rebound is therefore an emergent property of complex
economic systems, with the multiple mechanisms and effects being
difﬁcult to isolate and measure, especially over the longer term. But a
growing body of evidence suggests that these effects are larger than
was previously thought and frequently offset or even eliminate the
energy savings from improved energy efﬁciency [36–39].
From an engineering perspective, energy demand may be reduced
by: improving the thermodynamic efﬁciency of energy conversion
devices such as boilers and engines; preserving, heat, light, momentum
or materials in passive systems, such as houses, cars and steel bars; or
reducing demand for ﬁnal energy services such as thermal comfort and
mobility [40]. For example: gas use for home heating may be reduced
by installing a more efﬁcient boiler, insulating the walls or roof, or
accepting lower internal temperatures; petroleum use for car travel
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may be reduced by improving the efﬁciency of the engine, reducing
the size, weight, rolling resistance and/or air resistance of the vehicle;
or simply driving less; and coal use for steel manufacture may be
reduced by improving the efﬁciency of blast furnaces, increasing scrap
recovery and product life, or designing buildings and products to use
less steel.
Globally, Cullen et al. [41,42] estimate that that global average
conversion losses could be reduced by a theoretical maximum of 89%
and passive systems losses by a practical maximum of 73%, implying
that current demand for energy services could be provided with
much lower energy consumption. But this is a theoretical potential,
so the technical and (especially) economic potential is likely to be
much less. Also, the rate at which improvements in conversion
efﬁciency or passive systems can be achieved is constrained by the
rate of turnover of the relevant capital stock. For example, cars and
white goods have an average lifetime of 10 years, while the lifetime
of power stations, blast furnaces, ships and aircraft can easily exceed
30 years [43]. Premature replacement of existing equipment can
accelerate the rate of efﬁciency improvement, but this involves trade-
offs between the energy used in constructing new equipment and
the energy used in operating the old equipment [44].
Further reductions in energy demandmay be achieved by reducing
demand for the relevant energy services (‘sufﬁciency’), but growing
incomes create strong pressures in the opposite direction. This is parti-
cularly the case for countries at earlier stages of industrial develop-
ment, but also applies more generally: for example, an analysis of
lighting demand over three centuries and six continents ﬁnds no
evidence of saturation even in the wealthiest countries [45]. Changes
in demand for energy services can often occur fairly rapidly, but these
too may be constrained by the lifetimes of relevant technologies and
infrastructures [46]. For example, the physical characteristics and
spatial location of houses, workplaces and other assets can lock-in
heating, cooling and mobility needs for decades. More generally,
voluntary actions to reduce any form of consumption face multiple
obstacles within a growth-based economy [47].
In sum, it can be misleading to equate improved energy efﬁciency
with reduced energy demand. The deﬁnition and measurement of
these terms deserves more careful attention, as does the complex
relationship between them. Similar comments apply to behavioural
change, or ‘sufﬁciency’, since this can also have unintended con-
sequences and necessarily involve swimming against a strong tide. A
failure to acknowledge these complexities may partly account for the
accumulation of estimates of ‘energy savings’ from speciﬁc interven-
tions, while aggregate energy consumption continues to rise. This
does not mean that energy demand cannot be reduced, but does
imply that it may be more challenging than many analyses, policy
documents and political statements suggest (e.g. [48]). Amongst
other things, it points to the necessity of energy and carbon pricing
as part of a portfolio of measures to reduce energy demand. This
portfolio is the subject of the following three sections.
5. Energy markets and energy demand
Most modern societies are market economies of various forms,
and since tradable energy commodities dominate total energy ﬂows,
energy demand is manifest as the aggregate purchases of those
energy commodities in various markets. A distinction is commonly
made between primary and ﬁnal energy consumption, with conver-
sion and distribution losses making the former larger than the latter.
With energy suppliers facing rising marginal costs, energy consumers
facing declining marginal utility, and government and regulatory
bodies intervening in various ways, the demand for these energy
commodities is in large part the emergent outcome of multiple
economic decisions by multiple economic actors in multiple markets.
Hence, energy demand is fundamentally an economic concept that
can be investigated with the tools of economics. Energy demand
responds to changes in energy prices, although to different degrees
in different markets and over different periods of time. However, the
simple textbook model of rational decision-making by well-informed
actors in well-functioning markets provides a poor approximation to
the markets for energy commodities and energy-using products, and
an even poorer approximation to the ‘market’ for energy efﬁciency.
This model therefore needs to be modiﬁed for more useful insights to
be obtained.
First, it is commonplace to observe that people do not ‘demand’
energy for its own sake, but in combination with energy-using
products that are used to provide ﬁnal energy services—such as
heating, lighting and motive power. Energy demand is therefore a
derived demand, driven in part by the demand for energy services
and inﬂuenced by the cost and efﬁciency of energy-using equip-
ment as well as the price of energy. Since efﬁciency improvements
reduce the effective price of energy services, they also increase
demand for those services (rebound). And since energy efﬁciency
has improved continuously over the past 150 years, the demand
for energy services has increased more rapidly than the demand
for energy [49,50].
Second, while most debates about energy demand focus upon
household consumption of electricity and fuels, this only accounts
for around one quarter of total energy consumption. In practice,
most of the energy ‘consumed’ by households is ‘embodied’ in
non-energy goods and services, with the energy being consumed
directly by upstream producers and distributors at different stages
of the global supply chains. It is therefore essential that analysts
and policymaker pay equal attention to energy demand in indus-
try, commerce and freight transport.
Third, the idealised model of well-informed rational economic
actors making ‘optimal’ decisions on the basis of known, invariant and
consistent preferences is an acknowledged ﬁction with strictly limited
usefulness. While economic incentives and cost-beneﬁt trade-offs
inﬂuence decisions on the purchase and use of energy and energy-
using products, they explain only a portion of observed behaviour—
even for large scale investment decisions by energy-intensive indus-
trial ﬁrms [51]. Most decisions relevant to energy consumption are
taken in the context of limited or asymmetric information about
energy (service) costs by actors who are greatly constrained in their
ability to respond to those costs even in circumstances where they are
aware of and paying close attention to them—which is rarely the case.
Behavioural economics provides a more robust understanding of
economic decision-making and provide strong evidence for multiple,
consistent and predictable departures from the orthodox model even
in situations where the economic incentives are strong, actors are
well-informed and conscious deliberation is involved [52,53]. Social
psychology, in turn, shows how broader values, attitudes, beliefs and
social norms profoundly inﬂuence different types of economic and
energy-related decision [54]. With energy costs being small, largely
invisible and poorly understood in most relevant situations, the more
common situation is unreﬂective, habitual energy consumption in
which energy costs are secondary to other factors such as convenience
and symbolism and where energy-using behaviours exhibit consider-
able inertia. This leads authors such as Schwanen et al. [55] to emp-
hasise the collective determinants of habitual behaviour rather than
the deliberate decisions of utility-maximising individuals.
Fourth, the focus of the orthodox model upon market equilibria
is of limited value in explaining market dynamics, including in
particular the source, rate and direction of technical change and
the parallel evolution of industrial structure, user preferences and
market institutions. A key factor driving energy consumption is
the speed of diffusion of energy using technologies, including both
the replacement of existing stock (e.g. cars, fridges, motors) and
the development and diffusion of new, energy-using capital goods
and consumer products (e.g. mobile phones, laptops, space cooling
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equipment). The former changes the efﬁciency with which current
energy services are provided – thereby stimulating increased dem-
and for those services – while the latter may create entirely new
markets, industries, consumer ‘needs’ and associated energy serv-
ice demands. Diffusion is inﬂuenced by multiple economic, social
and political factors and since energy efﬁciency represents a
secondary and largely invisible attribute of most technologies, it
plays only a limited role in the decisions of producers, consumers
and other relevant actors.
Finally and most importantly, the focus on autonomous decision-
making by individuals neglects how preferences, attitudes, expecta-
tions and behaviours are embedded in and shaped by broader
physical and social systems that both enable and constrain individual
choice. Consider, for example, the travel choices available to house-
holds living in low-density suburbs, with inadequate public transport
and facing a 20-mile commute to work each day. As described in
Section 7, energy services such as mobility are provided through
large-scale, capital intensive and long-lived infrastructures that co-
evolve with associated technologies, institutions, skills, knowledge
and behaviours to create ‘sociotechnical systems’ [56]. While energy
demand depends upon economic decisions informed by individual
preferences, those preferences are to a large degree shaped, stabilised
and maintained by the sociotechnical system themselves.
6. Energy policy and energy demand
Deliberate attempts by governments to reduce energy demand
(framed as ‘energy conservation’) date back to the oil price rises of
the 1970s and the subsequent concerns about energy security.
Attention waned after the oil price falls of the 1980s when market
liberalisation dominated the agenda, but since then demand reduc-
tion has gained prominence as a means to mitigate climate change—
now framed as ‘promoting energy efﬁciency’. Policy in this area is
growing in breadth and ambition and is having a demonstrable effect
in many areas (e.g. white goods, buildings, vehicles, motors), but it
remains primarily informed by orthodox economics. Other perspec-
tives such as social psychology and innovation studies are less
inﬂuential but may complement the dominant approach. This section
summarises the key insights offered by these perspectives and how
they may be used.
Despite the caveats presented in Section 5, it is clear that energy
prices matter a great deal—especially over the longer term when
organisations and households have time to adjust. A mountain of
evidence demonstrates that higher energy prices lead to lower energy
demand at all levels—as simple theory would predict. Trying to reduce
energy demand without raising energy prices is akin to pushing a rock
up a hill—it is hard work and at some point the rock will roll back
down. The orthodox view is that prices should fully reﬂect costs,
including the external costs of pollution—although many economists
and most non-economists would consider the latter to be non-
quantiﬁable. Nevertheless, there is a powerful rationale for raising
the price of fossil-based energy through some form of carbon pricing.
This should be as comprehensive as possible, increasing in stringency
over time in line with long-term emission targets, and with the rev-
enues being used to reduce labour and income taxes and/or support
other policy objectives. But while carbon/energy pricing is necessary, it
is far from sufﬁcient and the achievable level of pricing is politically
constrained [57]. Carbon pricing can have signiﬁcant impacts on
income distribution and economic competitiveness, and while rev-
enue recycling can make such policies both distributionally progres-
sive and economically beneﬁcial at the aggregate level, some industrial
sectors and social groups could still be hard-hit. Complementary
policies are therefore required to reduce other obstacles to demand
reduction, as well as to improve the political acceptability of carbon
pricing itself—for example by exempting certain sectors or protecting
low-income groups.
Even without carbon pricing, many studies suggest that there are
numerous cost effective opportunities to improve energy efﬁciency in
the majority of end-use sectors—as exempliﬁed by the marginal
abatement cost curves developed by McKinsey and others [58]. The
dominant question then becomes ‘why are these opportunities not
being taken up?’—with the dominant answer being ‘there are multi-
ple, overlapping non-price barriers to improved energy efﬁciency’ [51].
For example, organisational staff may lack the time to identify and
implement energy efﬁciency opportunities; they may employ simple
payback calculations or rules of thumb rather than detailed invest-
ment appraisals; they may lack information on current energy
consumption, energy efﬁciency opportunities and/or the energy costs
of different investment options; they may face difﬁculties in raising
capital, either internally or externally; they may be concerned about
production interruptions, or the poor performance of energy-efﬁcient
technologies; they may lack the incentive to improve energy efﬁciency
—for example, if energy use by their department is not directly
metered or billed; and so on. These obstacles are typically much
larger for households than for ﬁrms and commonly act in combination
to block apparently cost effective investments. While many of these
obstacles represent real costs that McKinsey and other analysts rout-
inely overlook, there are often ways of reducing these costs through
organisational initiatives or policy interventions—such as minimum
efﬁciency standards, labelling schemes, subsidised energy audits,
building regulations, reporting requirements, targeted information
programmes and the like. The impact of these policies is hard to
assess, but several studies indicate that they can be cost-effective
[59,60]. These approaches should therefore play a central role in
attempts at demand reduction.
Given the limitations of orthodox economics identiﬁed in the
previous section, policy interventions informed solely by this frame-
work are likely to be insufﬁcient. Behavioural economics and social
psychology provide deeper insights into the reasons why apparently
cost-effective opportunities are neglected and can inform the design
of more effective interventions that encourage energy and economic-
ally efﬁcient choices. For example: people focus on losses more than
gains, so energy efﬁciency information is best framed as preventing a
loss rather than providing a gain; people tend to choose the default
option, so steps should be taken to ensure that this is energy-
efﬁcient; people care about relative rather than absolute perfor-
mance, so information on household energy consumption should be
benchmarked against immediate neighbours; people are heavily
inﬂuenced by who communicates information, so the beneﬁts of
energy efﬁciency should be communicated by trusted individuals;
people are inﬂuenced more by salient than accurate information, so
visual cues and vivid descriptions should be employed; and so on
[61–66]. Governments are increasingly using these ideas to inform
policy design, but they have yet to have much inﬂuence on energy
efﬁciency policy. While we are unlikely to ‘nudge’ our way to a low
energy future, such approaches have the potential to complement
more traditional policies.
Both economic and social psychological approaches focus primarily
upon encouraging the adoption of existing cost-effective technologies
or the efﬁcient use of those technologies. But much larger opportu-
nities to reduce energy demand lie in encouraging the diffusion of
novel, energy-efﬁcient technologies and systems, such as heat pumps,
solid wall insulation and hybrid vehicles. Technologies such as these
typically face an uphill struggle when ﬁrst introduced, since they
perform relatively poorly compared to established technologies and
are more expensive since they have yet to beneﬁt from scale and lear-
ning economies. New technologies may also lack established supply
chains and market structures, ﬁt poorly within existing infrastructure,
be unfamiliar to key intermediaries such as contractors and suppli-
ers, require signiﬁcant changes in user practices and face political
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opposition and regulatory obstacles (see Section 7). While such
problems are common to many new technologies, the ‘market pull’
for energy efﬁcient technologies is weak unless they simultaneously
offer other user beneﬁts—not least because public good beneﬁts such
as climate protection and energy security are not captured by indi-
vidual adopters [67]. There is therefore a case for targeted support for
the development and diffusion of new, energy-efﬁcient technologies
by such means as R&D subsidies, demonstration programmes, tech-
nology incubators and accelerators, public procurement programmes,
tax breaks, technology-forcing standards and so on [67]. These policies
exist to varying degrees in different jurisdictions, but at present
innovation support is strongly biased towards energy supply rather
than energy demand [68].
An effective policy approach to reducing energy demand can ther-
efore draw upon all these perspectives, combining revenue-neutral
carbon pricing with policies to reduce non-price barriers to improved
energy efﬁciency, behavioural interventions to encourage more energy
efﬁcient choices and support for energy-efﬁcient technologies at each
stage of the innovation chain. With careful design, these approaches
can be mutually supportive: higher energy prices can induce low-
energy innovation and bring forward the date at which new, energy-
efﬁcient technologies become competitive; behavioural interventions
and removal of non-price barriers can encourage cost-effective invest-
ment, ease the economic impact of higher energy prices and reduce
the political opposition to those prices; recycling of carbon tax
revenues can provide funds for innovation support, adoption subsidies
and protection of vulnerable sectors and groups; and so on [67]. These
elements are visible in the policy mix of most OECD countries but
typically lack coherence and adequate political support. As a result,
their net impact has been rather limited to date and biased towards
incremental rather than radical change. How these more radical
changes can be achieved is the key question for energy efﬁciency
policy in the next decade. Pushing harder with existing policy instru-
ments will certainly be necessary [67], but it may also be helpful to
frame the challenge in a different way: namely, as requiring more far-
reaching changes in the sociotechnical systems that provide energy
services. The next and ﬁnal section summarises the additional insights
that this perspective may provide.
7. Sociotechnical systems and energy demand
Economics and social psychology share a common focus on
individual choice and provide policy prescriptions which seek to
inﬂuence those choices. But a contrary viewpoint is that effective
change requires a focus on the collective inﬂuences on individual
choice and the systems that both enable and constrain those choices.
The core insight here is that energy-related decisions are structured
by the systems that provide energy services such as heating and
personal mobility. These systems are termed ‘sociotechnical’ since
they involve interlinked social and technical elements that co-evolve
over many decades [69–72]. These sociotechnical systems may be
only dimly understood by the actors involved in reproducing them,
but they constrain the agency of those actors and strongly inﬂuence
the type and quantity of energy required to provide particular energy
services. Hence, it is important to understand how these systems
function, how they can change and how these changes can be
directed and accelerated by public policy.
A particularly important and illuminating example is our car-based
system of personal transport. This is centred on an individual artefact –
the automobile – but this artefact is linked to and dependent upon
multiple social and technical elements at a variety of levels. These
include, but are not conﬁned to: the global car industry and its many
associated supply chains; the car maintenance and distribution net-
work; the global oil industry and the associated infrastructure of oil
wells, pipelines, reﬁneries, distribution networks and fuel stations; the
road infrastructure and trafﬁc system; the patterns of land use that
have developed around that road infrastructure, including amenities
and workplaces that are only accessible by car; the multiple institu-
tions, regulations and policies associated with the production and use
of cars; the engineering skills and knowledge built up over decades in
a variety of domains; the political power of relevant interest groups;
the daily travel routines, behaviour and expectations of millions of car
owners; and the symbolism and cultural norms that have become
associated with car-based mobility (‘car culture’) [72]. These different
elements act together to shape the level and pattern of personal
mobility and hence the energy use for that mobility. While reductions
in energy demand can be achieved through incremental changes in
individual system elements (e.g. by using lighter and more fuel efﬁc-
ient vehicles) larger reductions are likely to require more radical
changes in the system itself, such as a shift away from internal
combustion engines to battery-electric motors, or the large-scale
substitution of personal car travel by mass transit systems [71].
Many authors have described how these systems evolve and bec-
ome established, how they encourage incremental change along pre-
dictable trajectories and how their stability can obstruct more radical
change [72–75]. Sociotechnical systems frequently rest upon core
technologies such as the internal combustion engine whose early
evolution involves considerable uncertainty. Historical experience
suggests that (contrary to the predictions of orthodox economics)
apparently inferior technologies can become dominant when they
obtain an early advantage that allow them to beneﬁt from various
positive feedback mechanisms—such as scale economies that reduce
costs, lower prices and increase demand; learning economies that
improve performance, increase product attractiveness and further red-
uce costs; and network economies that enhance value through the
development of complementary goods and services [72,76–78]. As the
core technology diffuses, other mechanisms come in to play to reinf-
orce its dominant position, such as: investments in supporting infrast-
ructure (e.g. roads, pipelines, garages); increased knowledge and
capabilities in relevant areas (e.g. motor engineering); the growing
economic and political power of relevant groups (e.g. the car industry);
the establishment of supportive legal, and institutional frameworks
(e.g. professional institutions, labour unions); and the evolving habits,
norms and aspirations of consumers [72]. These interdependent and
co-evolving elements combine to form geographically extensive sys-
tems that becomes increasingly entrenched, or locked-in, making it
difﬁcult for technologies and behaviours that diverge in various ways
from the dominant system (e.g. electric vehicles, light rail, car sharing)
to become established [76,79].
Geels’ ‘Multi Level Perspective’ (MLP) provides one way of under-
standing the stability of these sociotechnical systems, as well as the
processes through which they may be transformed (‘transitions’) [56].
Informed by a series of historical case studies ; (e.g. [70,73,80,81]),
Geels explains radical change as the result of interactions between
three levels: the system itself which may be encountering internal
difﬁculties (or more speciﬁcally the conventions, rules and norms that
guide the actors in the system, termed the ‘regime’); the ‘niches’ in
which radical innovations are being developed and protected in some
way from the dominant system; and the exogenous socio-economic
‘landscape’ that is imposing pressures on the system. Relevant low-
energy niches for personal mobility may include hybrid and battery
electric vehicles, urban mass transit systems, communal and commer-
cial car sharing and sustainable urban planning, while relevant land-
scape pressures may include rising oil prices, international agreements
on climate change and the rapid development of ICT.
Based upon analyses of previous ‘socio-technical transitions’ (e.g.
sailing ships to steam ships [70]; Dutch water supply [73]; US factory
organisation [81]), Geels proposes a variety of pathways through
which systems may be transformed [82]. A common theme is that
niche technologies breakthrough when their internal momentum
combines with growing tensions within the existing socio-technical
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system and growing external pressures upon it. Together, these cre-
ate ‘windows of opportunity’ for radical change. If successful, the
breakthrough of new innovations trigger a series of inter-related
technical, industrial, social and cultural changes that combine to
create a new and different sociotechnical system based around a
different set of core technologies.
Framing the challenge of energy demand reduction in this way
encourages a move away from the individualist and incremental focus
of current policy approaches and towards more overarching visions of
long-term, systemic change. For example, visions of a future, low
energy mobility system may build on a range of existing niche
activities to include: land use planning that minimises travel needs;
multimodal, mobility-on-demand urban transport systems; electric
vehicles that are fully integrated into a smart grid and providing back-
up power; prioritisation of cycling and walking in urban develop-
ments; and so on. Given the complexity of personal mobility, a future
sustainable transport system seems more likely to encompass a range
of (currently niche) innovations acting in synergy, rather than being
centred upon a single dominant technology like the automobile. To
deliver signiﬁcant demand reductions, these need to reverse the trend
of the last two centuries—speciﬁcally by enabling and encouraging
people to travel less often over shorter distances at slower speeds in
more efﬁcient and fuller vehicles using lower carbon energy sources.
The MLP has been developed and applied as an analytical
framework to explain historical transitions that took decades to
unfold and were largely autonomous, unplanned and energy-
using. But to be useful for energy policy, it needs to be remoulded
into a prescriptive framework that is suitable for ‘steering’ future
transitions that are directed, rapid and energy-saving. This repre-
sents a challenge and one that is not always consistent with the
intentions and interests of the researchers involved, many of
whom are primarily interested in historical explanations [83].
However, an increasing number of researchers have taken up this
challenge and developed ideas on ‘strategic niche management’ [84],
‘transition management’ [85] and related approaches [86] and have
begun to apply these to speciﬁc policy areas. Reﬂecting the complexity
and unpredictability of the mechanisms involved, these approaches
emphasise things like: the role of shared, long-term visions; the
importance of coordinating policies both horizontally (e.g. between
sectors) and vertically (e.g. betweenministries and agencies); the need
for continuous monitoring and adaptation; the need to keep options
open and encourage parallel developments; the importance of inte-
grating producers and end users in the innovation process; the need
for a portfolio of instruments, including technology-speciﬁc policies;
the complementary role of social and organisational innovations; and
so on. Despite this, the means by which large-scale transitions may be
‘steered’ still remains rather vaguely speciﬁed and the extent to which
they can be steered remains contested [83,87]. Hence, while the
sociotechnical perspective helps to focus attention on systemic deter-
minants of energy demand and the need for radical system change, its
practical implications for policy require much more development.
8. Summary
This article has reviewed the issues associated with energy dem-
and reduction, the dominant framings of that challenge, the current
policy approaches to meeting that challenge and the insights offered
by a broader socio-technical perspective on that challenge. There are
three broad conclusions.
First, reducing energy demand may prove more difﬁcult than is
commonly assumed. Complex economic systems necessarily require
large energy ﬂows, the correlation between energy consumption and
economic growth is very strong and orthodox economics is likely to
have underestimated the dependence of that growth upon increased
energy consumption. The common expectation of energy efﬁciency
improvements leading to proportional reductions in energy demand is
misconceived—the linkages between the two are complex and
rebound effects are frequently large. Much analysis and policy debate
continues to oversimplify the issues involved.
Second, energy demand is an economic concept and that demand
will not be reduced in the absence of rising energy prices and policies
to reduce the economic barriers to improved energy efﬁciency. But
although this framing is necessary and dominant, it has important
limitations and the recommended policy approaches are insufﬁcient.
Behavioural interventions to encourage more energy-efﬁcient choices
and support for new, energy efﬁcient technologies at each stage of the
innovation chain are also required. These measures are underrepre-
sented in the current policy mix which remains largely focused upon
energy supply and incremental changes within existing systems.
Third, an effective response to climate change is likely to require
larger and more rapid reductions in energy demand than have been
achieved in the past. This in turn implies large-scale transformations in
the ‘sociotechnical’ systems that provide energy services such as
thermal comfort and personal mobility. Most historical transforma-
tions in systems such as these have not been deliberately directed by
governments, and the nature, direction, speed and ultimate destina-
tion of these transformations is difﬁcult to envisage. A key challenge
for policy is not just to provide that direction, but to do so in a way
that overcomes the inertia of sunk investment and delivers the speed
of change required to avoid dangerous climate change. The growing
literature on sociotechnical transitions could provide a source of ideas
to assist in this task.
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